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Abstract 
This article focuses on the role corrupt institutions (microfinance institutions) play in microfinance not 
being accessible for business development in Africa. It specifically sheds light on the contexts of Nigeria 
and Ghana to tease out the challenges and opportunities for small businesses consequent upon a culture 
of corruption in these countries and associated challenges for small business owners and entrepreneurs 
as well as microbusiness development. As well-known, in many developing countries with a high level of 
corruption, there is potentially a high incidence of institutional void, which presents setback and 
challenges for businesses to thrive. Microbusiness development relies largely on effective institutions to 
develop, and in situations where institutions are corrupt, these challenges are rather redoubled thus 
posing a threat to entrepreneurship development. Therefore, these contexts enable us to understand and 
interrogate the challenges facing microbusiness development, where corrupt microfinance institutions 
exist, as well as business opportunities if these corrupt institutions were not present. Thus this paper 
argues that for businesses to thrive enabling and effective institutional mechanisms are crucial, which 
will facilitate opportunities for microbusiness development.  
Keywords: microfinance institutions; institutional corruption; Ghana; Nigeria; microbusiness 
development. 
JEL Classification: L26; P19; J48. 
Introduction 
The focus of this article is to examine the role corrupt institutions play in microfinance viability 
(and development) in Africa. It specifically sheds light on corrupt social contexts like Nigeria 
and Ghana to tease out the challenges and opportunities for small businesses consequent upon a 
culture of corruption in these countries and associated viability of microfinance for businesses 
and/or microbusiness development (World Bank, 2009). Combatting corruption is an important 
economic, commercial and social issue in most human societies (Muhammed & Reddy, 2019; 
Boyes-Watson, 2013; Padhay, 1986). Scholars (see Muhammed & Reddy, 2019; Mersland & 
Strom, 2009) have highlighted how an effective anti-corruption practice can potentially decrease 
corruption in society and organisation.  
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Microfinance institutions are corporate bodies that are established in order to finance small-
scale businesses (micro-enterprises) and local economic activities which were ab initio excluded 
from mainstream banking practice and formal finance (Muhammed & Reddy, 2019). 
Nevertheless, in Sub-Saharan Africa, microfinance is at incipient stage, and most low income 
earners, including many of the poor, find it challenging  to access financial services (Spencer & 
Wood, 2005) exacerbating poverty and poor business development (World Bank, 2009). Huge 
disparities exist between African countries and other countries in relation to access to 
microfinance and its viability in supporting business development given the incidence of corrupt 
institutions (Spencer & Wood, 2005; Hartarska, 2005). Questionable working practices, poor 
corporate governance, poor internal control mechanisms, inept political leadership and unethical 
weak institutions all contribute to underperformance of microfinance development in Africa 
(Mersland & Strom, 2009). For example, in Nigeria, governance culture, fraud and transparency 
have been identified as impediments (Adegbite, 2012; Okike, 2007); and in Ghana Osei-
Assibey (2011) has observed comparable state of affairs. Evidence elsewhere suggests that 
corrupt practices and weak institutions can be detrimental to microfinance viability and business 
development (Chiumya, 2006; Lafourcade, Isern, Mwangi, & Brown, 2005; Basu, Blavy & 
Yulek, 2004; Copestake, 2002; Vaughan, 1996).  
Nevertheless, researches focusing on societies, which are relatively successful in curbing 
corruption in order to bring about successful microfinance development, are relatively rare in 
the developing countries (Osei-Assibey, 2011). Additionally, examining failure and/or 
underperformance of microfinance institutions is significant because of the important resources 
they leverage regarding poverty alleviation and national development (Lopatta, Tchikov, 
Jaeschke & Lodhia, 2017). Therefore, this paper aims to focus on Ghana and Nigeria, two 
countries under the jackboot of corruption and institutional malfeasance, which constitute 
setback to entrepreneurial growth, small business development and access to microfinance 
(Osei-Assibey, 2011). To actualise the intention of this paper, prior, relevant literature was 
reviewed to interrogate how corrupt practices in various institutions that facilitate access to 
microfinance in the two countries explored here. This process helped in shedding light on the 
dynamics of corruption and its consequent impact on microfinance viability, institutions and 
business development. Guided by this excuse, this paper identified some issues if dealt with 
would translate into more effective microfinance and business development despite the 
challenges posed by corrupt microfinance institutions in these countries.   
This paper found that although corruption cannot be completely eradicated; however, it can be 
minimised which will translate into microfinance viability. Also, the paper noted that although 
corruption exists, through institutional voids, but better corporate governance, checks and 
balances and implementation of anti-corruption measures as well as ethical leadership will be 
instrumental in creating institutional environment that supports microfinance viability and small 
business venturing. This paper also revealed a number of best practices in Nigeria and Ghana to 
ameliorate the incidence of corrupt behaviours, which include, but are not limited to, strong 
monitoring, review of decision-making processes, anti-corruption culture, transparent practice, 
and ethical behaviours. Consequently, this article widens knowledge on the notion that although 
corrupt practices and institutions are widespread in developing countries (Africa), taking the 
above measures could contribute to better society and more viable business venturing. The 
article is divided into sections: the next section focuses on the contexts being examined; second 
section is the overview of relevant, prior literature; and third section examines suggestion for 
the way forward.  
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Study Context: Ghana and Nigeria – Good Bedfellows?  
Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy yet more than 70% of the country’s population lives below 
the poverty line (Frynas, 2005). Weak economy, crushing poverty, corruption, ineffective 
institutions and inept political governance have aggravated its woes (Adegbite & Nakajima, 
2012). This situation has made some of its citizens to lose confidence in the country’s political 
leadership and legitimacy concerning the provision of their basic necessities. They now resort to 
entrepreneurship as a means to eke out a living. Sadly, microfinance in Nigeria is hardly 
accessed by those that need it (Olarenwaju & Olabisi, 2012). Although regulatory measures 
have been institutionalised including Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE), Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA, 2004), corruption and fraud 
are rife (Adegbite, 2012).  
The history of microfinance in Nigeria started with the evolution of “esusu” (“osusu” or 
“isusu”) – a rotating credit and savings association and a financial self-help group scheme. 
These informal credit granting and self-help schemes revolutionised into rotating and (or non-
rotating) savings and credit schemes to register cooperatives and eventually banks (Okorie & 
Miller, 1976). Subsequently, these self-help groups together with capacity-building and liquidity 
exchange system were upgraded and spread to several other parts of Nigeria, including Farmers 
Development Union (FADU). In a bid to modernise these informal credit and savings 
associations in the 1970s and 1980s, 137 cooperatives and 176 informal groups were created, 
and by 1994 a good number of community banks were operational facilitating granting of loans 
and credit to farmers and small businesses in the communities. However, performance of these 
credit schemes/banks and effectiveness of the regulatory and monitoring institutions is in 
question given institutional voids enabling weak enforcement (Bakre, 2007). As a result, 
Agbiboa, (2013) noted that corruption in Nigeria is semper et ubique. In a corrupt country such 
as Nigeria, driving accountability and transparency as well as accessing microfinance has 
proved very challenging (Emeseh & Songi, 2014; Olarenwaju & Olabisi, 2012). Exacerbating 
this context is Nigeria’s “patronage-based Nigerian society” (Bakre, 2007), which fuels 
corporate malfeasance, where consideration is given to “connected” people in society whilst 
disadvantaging others in accessing loans and credit (Olarenwaju & Olabisi, 2012; Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2012).  
Similarly, in Ghana Osei-Assibey (2011) and Boateng (2015) noted that microfinance 
institutions were founded following the perceived deficiencies in the prevailing financing 
schemes for small businesses and the poor. Thus, by 2011 new companies were licenced to 
begin operations, and existing institutions and Non-deposit taking Financial Non-Governmental 
Organisations (FNGOs) that met the conditions stipulated by the government (Bank of Ghana) 
for licencing were permitted to transform into microfinance institutions (Boateng, 2015). 
Nevertheless, Andah (2008) observed that despite government’s committed intention to sustain 
emerging small business in Ghana by transforming credit schemes to allow rise of microfinance, 
there exist governance and monitoring issues stemming largely from corruption and institutional 
voids. It is on this score that Asiama & Osei (2007) eloquently asserted that “despite decades of 
public provision and direction of provision of microcredit, policy orientation, and the entry of 
new players, the supply of microcredit is still inadequate” in Ghana. Some of the impediments 
to the development of small business and microfinance viability included undercapitalisation, 
regulatory and supervisory loopholes and inefficient management amongst others. Comparable 
issues were also highlighted  by several authors (Boateng, 2015; Osei-Assibey, 2011), which 
include diversion of funds, frequent changes and inadequate finance in government policies, 
huge loan losses, and heavy transaction costs posing obstacles to the growth of business 
entrepreneurship.  
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Understanding Institutions 
Institutions are considered as a network of cultural and societal apparatuses guiding 
organisational and people’s behaviour and actions including behaviour about access to 
microfinance, which can aid business development (Bakker, Schaveling, & Nijhof, 2014; Scott, 
1995; North, 1990). As noted by Scott (1995) institutions include formal and informal 
mechanisms and/or frameworks permitting efficient interactions between social actors such as 
banks, creditors and small business entrepreneurs in this context (Bakker et al., 2014). 
Institutions are therefore various mechanisms, instruments, values, myths, practices, 
relationships and belief systems that facilitate in maintaining relatively stable forms of 
organisational and societal practices including (Kostova & Roth, 2002). It is on this basis that 
Kostova & Roth (2002) observed that they consist of societal “higher order” issues beyond a 
specific organisation, constituting or restraining the interests and political participation of social 
actors without requiring recurring authoritative interference to achieve definite regularities 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) for example resource distribution, benchmarks to access to 
business finance and policymaking. Accordingly, Giddens (1984) noted that institutions include 
the government, business institutions, legal system, and business system that govern human 
actions.  
Institutions enable the creation of standards, codes of conduct, policies, and strategies that guide 
behaviours including bribery, fraud and illegitimate actions, which could threaten small 
business owners’ access to microfinance (Lopatta et al., 2017; Lafourcade et al., 2005). 
Moreover, these institutions are closely connected with each other, creating, enabling and 
transmitting illegitimacy, corrupt practices and unethical behaviour and actions, for example, 
bribery and not giving loans to people that truly deserve it, which could be detrimental to 
economic development. Consistent with the above contention, general approach to institutional 
working, understanding and governance – institutionalism – can be conceived from two main 
aspects: formal and informal institutions (North, 1990). The former is about well-established 
policies, laws and codes that guide corporate and human actions; while the latter focuses on 
various social habits, values, myths and belief system that also shape human/organisational 
actions. Understanding institutional arrangement also sheds light on legitimacy as well as 
emphasises why organisational behaviours in a specific society are similar or “isomorphic” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Thus, why microfinance organisations operate the way they do in 
these countries is as a result of what is acceptable or unacceptable for their continual existence 
in corrupt regimes (Suchman, 1995). Correspondingly, DiMaggio & Powell (1983) divided 
institutional factors in three domains: mimetic, coercive, and normative. Scott (1995) added to 
this literature by highlighting three aspects including normative, regulative and cultural-
cognitive. However, a lack of enabling, effective institutions exacerbates institutional void, 
which is not absence of institutions but unworkable, corrupt institutions that are prevalent in 
Africa (Amaeshi, Adegbite, & Rajwani, 2016).  
Corruption and Institutional Voids  
In their seminal work, Winning in Emerging Markets, Palepu & Khanna (2010) coined the term 
institutional voids describing the absence of intermediaries including credit card systems, 
market research firms and appropriate market enabling efficiently connect buyers and sellers in 
international markets. They further argue that these gaps or voids are existent in specific 
markets serving as obstacles to the ideal relationship and transactions between buyers and 
sellers as well as businesses and financial institutions (Amaeshi et al., 2016). These voids could 
be corrupt practices such as bribery, fraud and the like (Azim et al., 2017). In their empirical 
study, Azim et al. (2017) found that if microfinance institutions are corrupt and “not seen to be 
tackling corruption, their legitimacy could be threatened … resulting in … business becoming 
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more difficult to operate” in the Bangladeshi context. This notion is being echoed by Osei-
Assiby (2011) in the Ghanaian context as well as the rest of Africa (Lafourcade et al., 2005).  
In emerging economies like Nigeria and Ghana, often some of the intermediaries that businesses 
require including viable banks to access loans and credit, regulation of intellectual property 
rights, reliable sources of information, and transaction modes, are in scarce supply triggering 
business underdevelopment (Spencer & Wood, 2005). Other factors including government 
policies, business laws, and social environment of the country are implicated in small businesses 
(not) accessing finance for business viability. Thus, market-driven economies as being 
contextualised in this paper require proper institutional infrastructures to support business to 
thrive and access microfinance. Regrettably, institutional voids and corruption is a roadblock to 
entrepreneurial opportunity in emerging economies. Both Mair & Marti (2009) and Khanna & 
Palepu, (1997) stressed that a lack of effective regulatory framework can be attributed to 
institutional voids, where institutional structures that support market, accountability, legitimacy 
and business responsibility are weak and/or incapacitated to perform the functions expected of 
them (Mair & Marti, 2009). As observed by Khanna & Palepu (1997) institutional void does not 
signify absence of institutions; it rather emphasises their incapacity to functional appropriately 
and effectively (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). For example, in instances where a microfinance 
institution lacks the capacity to police and regulate businesses’ activities and grant loans/credit 
to individuals that really need them through misappropriation of funding and granting of loan as 
a result of corruption and related phenomena (Mair & Marti, 2009).  
Corruption, Microfinance Institutions and Business Development 
Corruption in African countries is described as an administrative culture involving adulation, 
bribery, patronage, graft, misfeasance, and peculation (Amaeshi et al., 2016; Padhay, 1986). 
Transparency International, which is a non-governmental organisation that monitors and 
publishes political and corporate corruption in international development, through Corruption 
Perceptions Index, has constantly rated Nigeria Ghana as very corrupt countries on the 
corruption spectrum – particularly Nigeria. Nigeria’s unique corrupt regime as well as its inept 
institutional governance mechanisms and regulatory system provide weak control mechanisms 
to control corporate activities including activities of microfinance institutions (banks) 
(Olarenwaju & Olabisi, 2012).  
In a study by Olarenwaju & Olabisi (2012) they found that women’s access to entrepreneurial 
resources in the informal Nigerian economy presents serious challenges to small business and 
entrepreneurial development. Similarly, as reported by Boateng (2015) the main constraints 
faced by microfinance institutions in Ghana “include poor regulatory environment, regular 
vicissitudes in government policies, paucity of capital … corruption, frauds and forgeries and 
poor corporate governance” (p. 52). This contention implies that the damaging cost of 
corruption entails that public confidence in government is undermined triggering widespread 
erroneous economic choices and the government’s ability to implement policies is constrained 
by corrupt practices, which could undermine the development of small businesses and 
legitimate granting of credit to entrepreneurs (Olarenwaju & Olabisi, 2012).   
Microfinance institutions are essentially established community-based organisations offering 
financial services to small scale businesses, low-income populations and local economic 
activities which were generally excluded from mainstream banking practice and formal finance 
(Muhammed & Reddy, 2019). The importance of microfinance institutions cannot be 
undermined as they serve a vital link between financial inclusion, national development and 
economic development of poor countries (Shabana, Buchholtz, & Carroll, 2016; Osei-Assibey, 
2011). No doubt, the countries investigated here – Nigeria and Ghana – have enormous 
potential; nonetheless, there are definite impediments to overcome, sadly, a crucial impediment 
is corruption (Agbiboa, 2012). The World Bank (2009) stressed that “corruption thrives where 
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there is discretion and monopoly, accountability is weak, and public servants are poorly paid”. 
This contention is at the root of entrepreneurial underdevelopment and underperformance in 
these contexts as well as incidence of institutional voids (Mair & Marti, 2009; Bakre, 2007). 
Institutionally writers (see Suchman, 1995; North, 1990) have observed that understanding the 
roles played by institutions in organisational and national practice and culture, can be 
instrumental in closing accountability, transparency and legitimacy “gap”, a metonym for 
institutional voids (Mair & Marti, 2009). This is the preoccupation of this paper; and 
surprisingly, the volume of research in this direction is quite sparse on the African continent 
(Amaeshi et al., 2016). This is the mainstay of our paper: focusing on understanding and 
interrogating the incidence of corruption in Ghana and Nigeria and how this ineluctably impacts 
negatively on microfinance and business development. Some of the institutional reasons for the 
above landscape are presented in the following sections.  
Weak policies and legal institutions 
One of the main reasons for the pattern of microfinance practice in the countries explored is the 
nature of their legal and policy institutions (Okike, 2007), which is responsible for regulating 
corporate and banking behaviour for effective corporate governance. There are a plethora of 
legal and policy instruments, which provide basis for organisational practice, responsibility, 
transparency and accountability as seen above. For example, in Nigeria legal as well as business 
regulation institutions such as Corporate Affairs Commission created by Companies and Allied 
Matters Acts (CAMA) in 1990 and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exist to fight 
corrupt practices associated with granting and accessing loans by small businesses. Likewise, in 
Ghana, bodies such as Financial Non-Governmental Organisations and Ghana Microfinance 
Institutions Network (GHAMFIN) exist. However, this is no antidote to sharp and corrupt 
practices in the sector. In Okike’s (2007) view, there exist sufficient laws and policies regulating 
corporate activities including microfinance (Lafourcade et al., 2005); nevertheless, what is 
lacking is effective implementation and enforcement of these policies/laws making 
microfinance and business development a herculean task on the African continent (Olarenwaju 
& Olabisi, 2012).  
Apparent lack of checks and balances  
Constant checks and balances is integral to effective implementation of microfinance viability 
on the continent (World Bank, 2009; Chiumya, 2006). This process serves as a way of 
promoting accountability and transparency and also gaining public trust (Lopatta et al., 2017; 
Osei-Assibey, 2011). As argued by Lafourcade et al. (2005) lack of check and balances 
negatively impacts business and institutional accountability, enforceability of laws and ethical 
behaviours. Evidence has revealed that when businesses and (financial) institutions are left 
unchecked they can become corrupt, irresponsible and illegitimate in their operationalisation. 
For example, the World Bank has recommended improved government oversight as well as 
checks and balances to efficiently control organisational operations. Promoting appropriate 
behaviour as well as result-oriented regulation through check and balances has become the norm 
in Western countries; nonetheless, African (developing) countries lag behind in ensuring checks 
and balances translating into ineffective implementation of policies and laws guiding 
microfinance and their institutions (Muhammed & Reddy, 2019; Chiumya, 2006; Hartaska, 
2005).  
Inept political leadership  
Leadership is essential in shaping national and organisational behaviour as well as socio-
cultural practices (Rotberg, 2012; Burns, 1978). Leadership, which is the capability of a leader 
to mobilise, galvanise and influence behaviour of people in a particular setting can bring change 
 Institutions, Corruption and Microfinance Viability in Developing Countries: the Case of Ghana … 67 
 
and/or radicalise ways of doing things (Kotter, 1990). Leadership is thus fundamental to ethical 
practice, organisational behaviour and national culture as it shapes what is appropriate or 
inappropriate (Rotberg, 2012) including unethical, corrupt microfinance culture (Nwagbara, 
2012; Chiumya, 2006). Correspondingly, Rotberg (2012) has explicitly remarked that leaders 
and their leadership style exert enormous influence on corporate behaviour as well as the overall 
working of the state and institutions that regulate human/organisational actions (Scott, 1995). 
Therefore, it can be argued that enabling political leadership is a sine qua non for responsible 
lending and microfinance culture in the context of Ghana and Nigeria, which have weak 
institutions (Okike, 2007).  
Accordingly, Amaeshi et al. (2016) observed that business managers, leaders and those saddled 
with provision and monitoring of microfinance availability/access follow in the footsteps of 
political leaders in a country, which shapes collective practice (Rotberg, 2012; Kotter, 1990). 
The inseparable association between political leadership and organisational culture including 
microfinance culture cannot be over-emphasised (Chiumya, 2006). Thus, in weak, ineffective 
institutional context, business leaders and managers are ineluctably drawn by the powers and 
style of political leadership prevalent in a context in their dealing including exhibiting best 
practice in microfinance for business development. Inept political leadership style technically 
moderates corporate governance and practice eliciting poor governance and unacceptable 
microfinance regimes (Rotberg, 2012). Thus, effective and ethical political leadership is 
reflected in positive institutional and corporate governance of organisations, guiding the 
strategies and vision of such establishments on the path of accountability, probity and ethics.  
Weak social movement/activism 
As well-known social movements, for example, NGOs and non-partisan formations can 
stimulate change as well as ignite corporate conscience and business ethics (Georgallis, 2017). 
One main reason behind ethical business practice including microfinance practice is the virility 
of social movements as they prod institutions and governments to rethink their place in society 
for effective working of institutions. As asserted by Kolk & Lenfant (2015) the activities of 
social movements have been described as “counter-hegemonic” as well as emancipatory 
initiatives to drive responsible business practice. They have been described as forces from 
below forcing institutions and government to rethink the interest of wider stakeholders for 
accountability, business responsibility and social justice. For instance, in the Arab context, 
protest in the wake of Arab Spring as well as collaborative work and international campaigns by 
social movements precipitated change in governance promoting the voice of the marginalised 
for inclusive society. Nonetheless, in regimes that decry social movement/activism, as seen in 
Nigeria and Ghana, inclusion, justice and fair play in microfinance can be problematic 
(Chiumya, 2006). However, in situations in which social movements are weakened, there is a 
tendency for corporate bodies to be unethical in their dealings (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015).  
Neo-patrimonial state and social connections  
Patrimonialism can be defined as political and social order where patrons secure the support and 
loyalty of clients by granting benefits from the state resources (or their own resources). On the 
other hand, neo-patrimonialism, helps in creating a ‘hybrid’ state, which Eke (1975) refers to as 
“two republics”. The dichotomy between the public and private spheres exists, at least formally, 
but in practice real decision-making occurs outside the confines of formal institutions (Smith, 
2007). Conversely, decisions about resource allocation and policies are made by powerful 
interest groups or politicians and their cronies who are connected by clientelist, personal and 
informal networks co-existing with the formal state structure (Joseph, 1987). As a consequence, 
neo-patrimonial societies fail to guarantee fair and ethical distribution of public resources such 
as microfinance to small businesses. This cultural practice and system is the foundation of most 
African countries’ political economy and society (Smith, 2007). 
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The literature on political economy of most African nations including Ghana and Nigeria 
(Agbiboa, 2012; Joseph, 1987) indicates the key features of a neo-patrimonial state include: 
presidentialism, the organised concentration of power on a group or single person; a culture of 
“rent-seeking” associated with private appropriation of resources by a specific group; use of a 
nation’s resources for political legitimation; and clientelism (patronage-based society), where 
power is sustained via the awarding of personal favours, including contracts, unsecured loans, 
and illicit granting of microfinance licenses, among others (Bakre, 2007; Basu et al., 2004). The 
last characteristic is essentially prevalent in Ghana and Nigeria (Chazan, 1989). This manifests 
in disparate circumstances. For instance, rather than navigating through the country’s 
bureaucratic set-up and expecting the state to provide services, citizens/businesses including 
small business owners that have social connections are more likely to look for support from 
personal networks and connection in patron-client settings (Joseph, 1987). This system is an 
impediment to availability and accessibility of microfinance by less “socially connected” and 
privileged business owners (Chiumya, 2006; Copestake, 2002).  
Conclusion 
This article has examined the association between institutions, corruption and microfinance 
viability in developing countries with focus on Ghana and Nigeria, sites that encourage corrupt 
practices in organisations charged with policing and implementing policies, laws and 
regulations about microfinance to small business owners for economic development. Through 
the analysis undertaken here – mediated by explication of prior, relevant literature on these 
phenomena – it can be gleaned that in settings in which corruption thrives, it is almost 
impossible for microfinance institutions and regulatory regimes to be ethical, responsible and 
corrupt-free. Consequently, such corrupt regimes constitute roadblocks to effective 
implementation of microfinance for loan availability to poor and small entrepreneurs for 
business development – and national development in the final analysis as well as poverty 
alleviation. A couple of issues have been identified in the literature including neo-patrimonial 
state and social connections, weak social movement/activism, inept political leadership, 
apparent lack of checks and balances and weak policies and legal institutions as triggers or 
facilitators of corrupt regimes that negatively impact microfinance regulation, monitoring and 
implementation. Therefore, for a more sustainable, effective and result-oriented microfinance 
regime, it is imperative that governments in developing countries – specifically Nigeria and 
Ghana – redouble their efforts to bring about better microfinance provision for business 
development and national prosperity.  
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